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Abstract
In the last several years, there have been several studies about the computational complexity of
classical planning assuming that the planner has complete knowledge about the initial situation. Re-
cently, there have been proposals to use ‘sensing’ actions to plan in the presence of incompleteness.
In this paper we study the complexity of planning in such cases. In our study we use the action
description language A proposed in 1991 by Gelfond and Lifschitz, and its extensions.
It is known that if we consider only plans of tractable (polynomial) duration, planning inA—with
complete information about the initial situation—is NP-complete: even checking whether a given
objective is attainable from a given initial state is NP-complete. In this paper, we show that the
planning problem in the presence of incompleteness is indeed harder: it belongs to the next level
of the complexity hierarchy (in precise terms, it is 62P-complete). To overcome the complexity
of this problem, Baral and Son have proposed several approximations. We show that under certain
conditions, one of these approximations—0-approximation—makes the problem NP-complete (thus
indeed reducing its complexity). Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the presence of complete information about the initial situation, a plan—in the sense
of classical planning—is a sequence of actions that takes the agent from the initial situation
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to a goal state. The computational complexity of finding a plan in this case has been well-
studied [5,6,14].
But often the agent may not have complete information about the initial situation. In
that case there may not exist a single sequence of actions that will take the agent from
any of the possible initial states to a goal state. If we assume that the agent can make the
necessary observations at run-time, then an off-line plan—that is constructed before run-
time—can be a conditional plan, encoding suggestions of different action sequences for
different initial states. But often the agent can only make ‘limited observations’ in some
situations. These ‘limited observations’ can be thought of as ‘sensing’ or ‘knowledge
producing’ actions whose execution does not change the state of the world, but rather
changes the agent’s knowledge about the world. In that case the conditional plans may
need to contain these sensing actions. Levesque in [13] gives the example of making a
plan to take a flight. The agent who does not know the departure gate at planning time,
must include the (sensing) action of ‘finding the departure gate number’, to be executed
after he/she gets to the airport and before he/she takes the appropriate branch of action
sequences that take him/her to the right gate.
In this paper, we study the complexity of (propositional) planning in these two cases—
with and without sensing actions—when the agent’s knowledge is incomplete. Since the
corresponding problems turn out to be of high complexity, it is important to develop sound
lower-complexity approximations to these problems. In this paper, we describe several
such approximations, study their complexity, and show that, indeed, planning under one
of these approximations (0-approximation) is (under certain assumptions) less complex.
Since the main idea behind 0-approximation is similar to the ideas used in the design of
the existing planners developed for planning with incompleteness [7,9–12,19,20,22,23],
we believe that the complexity results will shed additional light into these planners and
also guide the development of future planners.
Our complexity analysis will be based on an extension [3,4] of the action description
language A proposed in 1991 by Gelfond and Lifschitz [8]. The language A and
its successors have made it easier to understand the fundamentals (such as inertia,
ramification, qualification, concurrency, sensing, etc.) involved in reasoning about actions
and their effects on a world, without getting into the details of particular logics, and we
would like to stick to that simplicity principle here. We now start with a brief description
of the languageA.
1.1. The languageA: brief reminder
In the language A, we start with a finite list of properties (fluents) f1, . . . , fn which
describe possible properties of a state. A state is then defined as a finite set of fluents, e.g.,
{} or {f1, f3}. We are assuming that we have complete knowledge about the initial state:
e.g., {f1, f3}means that in the initial state, properties f1 and f3 are true, while all the other
properties f2, f4, . . . are false. The properties of the initial state are described by formulas
of the type
initially f,
where f is a fluent literal, i.e., either a fluent fi or its negation ¬fi .
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To describe possible changes of states, we need a finite set of actions. In the language
A, the effect of each action a can be described by formulas of the type
a causes f if f1, . . . , fm,
where f,f1, . . . , fm are fluent literals. A reasonably straightforward semantics describes
how the state changes after an action:
• If, before the execution of an action a, fluent literals f1, . . . , fm were true, and the
domain description contains a rule “a causes f if f1, . . . , fm”, then this rule is
activated, and after the execution of the action a, f becomes true. Thus, for some
fluents fi , we will conclude that the fluent fi holds in the resulting state, and for
some other fluents fj , we conclude that the negation ¬fj holds in the resulting state.
• If for some fluent fi , no activated rule enables us to conclude that fi is true or
false, this means that the execution of action a does not change the truth of this
fluent; therefore, fi is true in the resulting state if and only if it was true in the old
state.
Formally, a domain description D is a finite set of value propositions of the type
“initially f ” (which describe the initial state), and a finite set of effect propositions of the
type “a causes f if f1, . . . , fm” (which describe results of actions). The initial state s0
consists of all the fluents fi for which the corresponding value proposition “initially fi”
is contained in the domain description. (Here we are assuming that we have complete
information about the initial situation.) We say that a fluent fi holds in s if fi ∈ s;
otherwise, we say that ¬fi holds in s. The transition function ResD(a, s) which describes
the effect of an action a on a state s is defined as follows:
• we say that an effect proposition “a causes f if f1, . . . , fm” is activated in a state s
if all m fluent literals f1, . . . , fm hold in s;
• we define V+D (a, s) as the set of all fluents fi for which a rule “a causes fi if
f1, . . . , fm” is activated in s;
• similarly, we define V−D (A,S) as the set of all fluents fi for which a rule “a causes¬fi if f1, . . . , fm” is activated in s;
• if V+D (a, s)∩ V −D (a, s) 6= ∅, we say that the result of the action a is undefined;• if the result of the action a is defined in a state s (i.e., if V +D (a, s) ∩ V −D (a, s)= ∅),
we define ResD(a, s)= (s ∪ V +D (a, s)) \ V −D (a, s).
A plan p is defined as a sequence of actions [a1, . . . , am]. The result ResD(p, s) of
applying a plan p to the initial state s0 is defined as
ResD
(
am,ResD(am−1, . . . ,ResD(a1, s0) . . .)
)
.
The planning problem is: given a domainD and a desired fluent literal f , find a plan which
leads to the state in which f is true.
Comment. In many practical problems, the goal is not a single fluent literal, but a logical
combination of different fluent literals. Problems of propositional planning, in which the
goal can be a propositional combination of fluent literals, can be reformulated in terms of
the above definition and are, thus, covered by this paper. Problems of first order planning,
in which the goal can be a first-order logical statement with quantifiers, are more complex;
none of our results and proofs apply verbatim to such problems.
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1.2. An extension of languageA which describes sensing actions: brief reminder
The formulation of the extension AK of A that allows sensing actions—recalled here
from [3,4]—is based on earlier work of formalizing sensing actions in [16,21]. In the
domain description D, in addition to value propositions and effect propositions, we may
also have sensing propositions of the type “a determines fi”. To deal with incomplete
information about the real world, we need to reason with the agent’s knowledge about the
world. A k-state is defined as pair 〈s,Σ〉, where s is the actual state, andΣ is the set of all
possible states where the agent thinks it may be in. Initially, the set Σ0 consists of all the
states s for which:
• a fluent fi is true (fi ∈ s) if the domain description D contains the proposition
“initially fi”;
• a fluent fi is false (fi /∈ s) if the domain description D contains the proposition
“initially¬fi”.
If neither the proposition “initially fi”, nor the proposition “initially¬fi” are in the domain
description, then Σ0 contains some states with fi true and others with fi false. The actual
initial state s0 can be any state from the set Σ0. The transition function due to action
execution is defined as follows:
• for proper (non-sensing) actions, 〈s,Σ〉 is mapped into 〈ResD(a, s),ResD(a,Σ)〉,
where:
– ResD(a, s) is defined as in the case of complete information, and
– ResD(a,Σ)= {ResD(a, s′) | s′ ∈Σ}.
• for a sensing action a which senses fluents f1, . . . , fk—i.e., for which sensing
propositions “a determines fi” belong to the domain D—the actual state s remains
unchanged while Σ is down to only those states which have the same values of fi
as s: 〈s,Σ〉 → 〈s,Σ ′〉, where
Σ ′ = {s′ ∈Σ | ∀i(16 i 6 k→ (fi ∈ s′ ↔ fi ∈ s))}.
Example 1 [3,4]. Consider the following example. We have a door with a lock, and we
have non-sensing actions push_door and flip_lock, and a sensing action check_if _locked.
The effect of these actions can be expressed in AK by the following effect propositions
and sensing proposition:
push_door causes open if ¬locked,¬jammed;
push_door causes jammed if locked;
flip_lock causes locked if ¬locked;
flip_lock causes ¬locked if locked;
check_if _locked determines locked.
The information that our agent has about the initial situation is that the door is not
open, and the lock is not jammed. (The agent does not know if the door is locked or
not.)
In this case the two initial k-states are: σ1 = 〈s1, {s1, s2}〉, and σ2 = 〈s2, {s1, s2}〉, where
s1 = {¬open,¬jammed, locked}, and s2 = {¬open,¬jammed,¬locked}.
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Based on our definition we now have the following:
• ResD(check_if _locked, σ1)= 〈s1, {s1}〉.
• ResD(check_if _locked, σ2)= 〈s2, {s2}〉.
• ResD(push_door, σ1)= 〈{¬open, jammed, locked}, {{¬open, jammed, locked}{open,
¬jammed,¬locked}〉.
• ResD(push_door, σ2)= 〈{open,¬jammed,¬locked}, {{¬open, jammed, locked},
{open,¬jammed,¬locked}〉.
• ResD(flip_lock, σ1)= σ2.
• ResD(flip_lock, σ2)= σ1. 2
In the presence of sensing, an action plan may no longer be a pre-determined sequence
of actions: if one of these actions is sensing, then the next action may depend on the result
of that sensing. In general, the choice of a next action may depend on the results of all
previous sensing actions. Such an action plan is called a conditional plan.
Example 2. For example, the agent in Example 1 would need the following conditional
plan to achieve its goal of opening the door:
check_if _locked;
if ¬locked then push_door else flip_lock;push_door. 2
It has been speculated that adding sensing actions increases the computational com-
plexity of the problem. In this paper, we show that the corresponding planning problem is
indeed harder: it belongs to the next level of the complexity hierarchy (in precise terms, it
is 62P-complete).
1.3. The notion of a 0-approximation
To overcome the complexity of this problem, Baral and Son [2] have proposed several
approximations, whose plans are always correct but which can miss a plan. The first
approximation—called 0-approximation—is as follows: An a-state (approximate state) s
is a finite set of fluent literals (i.e., fluents and their negations). The initial a-state s0 consists
of all the fluent literals f for which the corresponding value proposition “initially f ” is
contained in the domain description. We say that:
• a fluent fi is true in s if fi ∈ s;
• a fluent fi is false in s if ¬fi ∈ s;
• a fluent fi is unknown in s if neither fi ∈ s, not ¬fi ∈ s.
The transition function ResD(a, s) which describes the effect of a proper action a on an
a-state s is defined as follows:
• we say that an effect proposition “a causes f if f1, . . . , fm” is activated in an a-state
s if all m fluent literals f1, . . . , fm hold in s;
• we say that an effect proposition “a causes f if f1, . . . , fm” is possibly activated in
an a-state s if all m fluent literals f1, . . . , fm possibly hold in s (i.e., are either true or
unknown in s);
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• we define VD(a, s) as the set of all fluent literals f for which a rule “a causes f if
f1, . . . , fm” is activated in s;
• we define V ′D(a, s) as the set of all fluent literals f for which a rule “a causes f if
f1, . . . , fm” is possibly activated in s;
• we then define ResD(a, s) as{
f | (f ∈ s ∨ f ∈ VD(a, s))&¬f /∈ V ′D(a, s)}.
For sensing actions, the result of applying a to an a-state s results in a set of a-states
each of which can be obtained by simply adding, to the a-state, the fluent literals that may
turn out to be true as a result of this sensing action.
Example 3. Let us now consider how we can use 0-approximation with the story in
Examples 1 and 2.
• The initial a-state will be s = {¬jammed,¬open}.
• Executing a sensing action leads to two possible states, depending on whether the




• ResD(flip_lock, {¬jammed,¬open, locked})= {¬jammed,¬open,¬locked}.
• ResD(push_door, {¬jammed,¬open,¬locked})= {¬jammed,open,¬locked}.
• From the above it can be easily shown that the plan in Example 2 can also be verified
as a plan that achieves the goal of making the door open, if we use the approximation.
• ResD(push_door, {¬jammed,¬open})= {}.
The above skeptical reasoning is important and necessary for the soundness result.
The intuition behind the skeptical reasoning is as follows. Initially the agent knows
the lock is not jammed and the door is not open and has no idea if the door is locked
or not. In that case there are two possibilities: either the door is locked, or it is not
locked. In the first case, if the agent executes push_door, then the lock gets jammed
and the door remains unopened; in the second case, after execution of push_door, the
door opens and the lock remains unjammed. Since the agent does not have a way to
distinguish between the two, a safe way is for it to conclude that it will not know if
the lock will be jammed and if the door will be open after executing push_door.
In the above formulation of ResD(a, s) the notion of ‘possibly activated’ and its
use in V ′D are responsible for the above described skeptical reasoning. 2
We are very optimistic about the practicality of 0-approximation. One of the main
reasons for this optimism is the similarity between the ideas of 0-approximation [4] and
semi-heuristic ideas underlying practically useful planners UWL, SADL, etc., described
in [10,11]; for example, Golden and Weld [10] state that:
“In UWL (and in SADL) individual literals have truth values expressed in three valued
logic: T , F , U (unknown).”
Similarly, Goldman and Boddy in [11] use a single model to represent both the world and
the planners knowledge about the world; this is similar to the notion of a 0-approximation,
where we also have a single model [4].
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To transform our optimism into practically useful tools, we must further analyze the
relationship between 0-approximation and the extant planners. A first step in this analysis
has been taken in [4].
2. Results
2.1. What kind of planning problems we are interested in
Informally speaking, we are interested in the following problem:
• given a domain description (i.e., the description of the initial state and of possible
consequences of different actions) and a goal (i.e., a fluent which we want to be
true),
• determine whether it is possible to achieve this goal (i.e., whether there exists a plan
which achieves this goal).
We are interested in analyzing the computational complexity of the planning problem,
i.e., analyzing the computation time which is necessary to solve this problem.
Ideally, we want to find cases in which the planning problem can be solved by a tractable
algorithm, i.e., by an algorithm U whose computational time tU (w) on each input w is
bounded by a polynomial p(|w|) of the length |w| of the input w:
tU (x)6 p(|w|)
(this length can be measured bit-wise or symbol-wise). Problems which can be solved by
such polynomial-time algorithms are called problems from the class P (where P stands
for polynomial-time). If we cannot find a polynomial-time algorithm, then at least we
would like to have an algorithm which is as close to the class of tractable algorithms as
possible.
Since we are operating in a time-bounded environment, we should worry not only about
the time for computing the plan, but we should also worry about the time that it takes to
actually implement the plan. If a (sequential) action plan consists of a sequence of 22n
actions, then this plan is not tractable. It is therefore reasonable to restrict ourselves to
tractable plans, i.e., to plans u whose duration T (u) is bounded by a polynomial p(|w|) of
the input w.
For conditional plans, the actual sequence of actions may depend on the situation; we
require that for every possible sequence of actions, the total number of consequent actions
is bounded by a polynomial p(|w|), i.e., informally, that the “plan executions” are of
polynomial size.
With this tractability in mind, we can now formulate the above planning problem in
precise terms:
• given: a polynomial p(n) > n, a domain description D (i.e., the description of the
initial state and of possible consequences of different actions) and a goal f (i.e., a
fluent which we want to be true),
• determine whether it is possible to tractably achieve this goal, i.e., whether there exists
a tractable-duration plan u (with T (u)6 p(|D|)) which achieves this goal.
We are interested in analyzing the computational complexity of this planning problem.
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2.2. Complexity of the planning problem for situations with complete information
For situations with complete information, the above planning problem is NP-complete:
Theorem 1. For situations with complete information, the planning problem is NP-
complete.
Comments.
• This result is similar to the result of Liberatore [14]. The main difference is that
Liberatore considers arbitrary queries from the language A, while we only consider
queries about the existence of a tractable action plan.
• The result of Liberatore is preceded by the results of Bylander [5] and Erol et al. [6]
where they study complexity of STRIPS. Here we use A and its extensions instead of
STRIPS since, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any formal treatment
of extensions of STRIPS dealing with sensing actions.
• For reader’s convenience, all the proofs are placed in the special (last) section.
• Some of this paper’s results were first announced in [1].
• The problem remains NP-complete even if we consider planning problems with a
fixed finite number of actions: even with two actions. If we only allow a single
action, then there is no planning any more: the only possible plan is, in any state,
to apply this only possible action and check whether we have achieved our goal yet;
the corresponding “planning” problem is, of course, solvable in polynomial time.
2.3. Useful complexity notions
For situations with incomplete information, the planning problem is more complicated—
actually, this problem belongs to the next levels of the polynomial hierarchy; see the exact
results below. For precise definitions of the polynomial hierarchy, see, e.g., [17]. Crudely
speaking, a decision problem is a problem of deciding whether a given input w satisfies a
certain property P (i.e., in set-theoretic terms, whether it belongs to the corresponding set
S = {w |P(w)}).
• A decision problem belongs to the class P if there is a tractable (polynomial-time)
algorithm for solving this problem.
• A problem belongs to the class NP if the formula w ∈ S (equivalently, P(w)) can be
represented as ∃uP(u,w), where P(u,w) is a tractable property, and the quantifier
runs over words of tractable length (i.e., of length limited by some given polynomial
of the length of the input). The class NP is also denoted by 61P to indicate that
formulas from this class can be defined by adding 1 existential quantifier (hence 6
and 1) to a polynomial predicate (P).
• A problem belongs to the class coNP if the formula w ∈ S (equivalently, P(w)) can
be represented as ∀uP(u,w), where P(u,w) is a tractable property, and the quantifier
runs over words of tractable length (i.e., of length limited by some given polynomial
of the length of the input). The class coNP is also denoted by 51P to indicate that
formulas from this class can be defined by adding 1 universal quantifier (hence 5
and 1) to a polynomial predicate (hence P).
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• For every positive integer k, a problem belongs to the class 6kP if the formula
w ∈ S (equivalently, P(w)) can be represented as ∃u1∀u2 . . .P (u1, u2, . . . , uk,w),
where P(u1, . . . , uk,w) is a tractable property, and all k quantifiers run over words of
tractable length (i.e., of length limited by some given polynomial of the length of the
input).
• Similarly, for every positive integer k, a problem belongs to the class 5kP if the for-
mula w ∈ S (equivalently, P(w)) can be represented as ∀u1∃u2 . . .P (u1, u2, . . . , uk,
w), where P(u1, . . . , uk,w) is a tractable property, and all k quantifiers run over
words of tractable length (i.e., of length limited by some given polynomial of the
length of the input).
• All these classes 6kP and 5kP are subclasses of a larger class PSPACE formed
by problems which can be solved by a polynomial-space algorithm. It is known
(see, e.g., [17]) that this class can be equivalently reformulated as a class of
problems for which the formula w ∈ S (equivalently, P(w)) can be represented as
∀u1∃u2 . . .P (u1, u2, . . . , uk,w), where the number of quantifiers k is bounded by a
polynomial of the length of the input, P(u1, . . . , uk,w) is a tractable property, and
all k quantifiers run over words of tractable length (i.e., of length limited by some
given polynomial of the length of the input).
A problem is called complete in a certain class if, crudely speaking, this is the toughest
problem in this class (so that any other general problem from this class can be reduced to
it by a polynomial-time reduction). It is still not known (2000) whether we can solve any
problem from the class NP in polynomial time (i.e., in precise terms, whether NP = P).
However, it is widely believed that we cannot, i.e., that NP 6= P. It is also believed
that to solve an NP-complete or a coNP-complete problem, we need exponential time
≈ 2n, and that solving a complete problem from one of the second-level classes 62P or
52P requires more computation time than solving NP-complete problems (and solving
complete problems from the class PSPACE takes even longer).
2.4. Complexity of the planning problem for situations with incomplete information:
situations with no sensing actions
Let us start our analysis with the case of no sensing.
Theorem 2. For situations with incomplete information and without sensing, the planning
problem is 62P-complete.
The problem remains 62P-complete even if we consider the planning problems with a
fixed finite number of actions: even with two actions.
Theorem 3. For situations with incomplete information and without sensing, the
0-approximation to the planning problem is NP-complete.
In other words, the use of 0-approximation cuts off one level from the complexity. So,
for this problem, 0-approximation is indeed computationally very efficient.
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This reduction is in good accordance with our intuitive understanding of this problem
and its 0-approximation:
• In the case of complete information, to represent a state, we must know which fluents
are true and which are false. Therefore, a state can be uniquely described by a subset
of the set of all the fluents—namely, the subset consisting of those fluents which are
true in this state. The total number of states is therefore equal to the total number of
such subsets, i.e., to 2F (where F is the total number of fluents).
• In the case of incomplete information, we, in general, do not know the state of the
system. So, the state of our knowledge is represented by a k-state [3,4]. It can be
easily shown [3,4] that the number of all possible k-states is 22F+F .
• In 0-approximation, an a-state is represented by stating which fluents are true, which
are false, and which are unknown. For each of F fluents, there are three different
possibilities, so, in total, in this approximation, we have 3F possible a-states.
So, going from a full problem to its 0-approximation decreases the number of
possible “states” from doubly exponential 22F+F to singly exponential 3F . Since planning
involves analyzing different possible states, it is no wonder that for 0-approximation, the
computation time should also be smaller. Again, this argument is not a proof of Theorem 3,
but this argument makes the result of Theorem 3 intuitively reasonable.
2.5. Complexity of the planning problem for situations with incomplete information:
situations with sensing
Let us now consider what will happen if we allow sensing actions.
Theorem 4. For situations with incomplete information and with sensing, the planning
problem is PSPACE-complete.
Comment. By a “planning problem”, we understand the problem of finding a tractable
plan. It is worth mentioning that the computational complexity of the planning problem
strongly depends on how we define the notion of a tractable plan:
• In this paper, we describe tractable plans as plans u of tractable (polynomial)
duration T (u).
• Alternatively, instead of simply restricting the duration T (u) of a plan u by a
polynomial p(|D|) of the length |D| of the problem’s input D, we could also require
that the length |u| of the total description of a conditional plan u should also be
tractable (i.e., we could also restrict the length |u| of the total description of a
conditional plan by q(|D|) for some polynomial q(n)).
Intuitively, this alternative restriction would be a much stronger restriction on the plan:
indeed, a conditional plan of tractable duration n can have branching at every step; in this
case, we have 2n possible action sequences which can require an exponential (intractable)
length to record. Rintanen has shown [20] that if we follow this alternative definition and
define a tractable plan as a plan of tractable length, then the planning problem becomes
52P-complete.
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Since the planning problem is of high computational complexity, it is reasonable to look
for approximations. We have already seen that for planning with incomplete information,
the use of 0-approximation drastically decreases the computational complexity. It turns
out that if we allow unlimited sensing, then the planning problem becomes so much more
complicated that 0-approximation is not helping anymore:
Theorem 5. For situations with incomplete information and with sensing, the
0-approximation to the planning problem is PSPACE-complete.
The proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 are similar to [15]. As one can see from the proofs, both
the planning problem itself and its 0-approximation remain PSPACE-complete even if we
consider the planning problems with a fixed finite number of actions: even with two proper
actions and a single sensing action which reveals the truth value of only one fluent—but
we are allowed to repeat this sensing action at different moments of time.
Although 0-approximation does not help by itself, it helps if combined with some
reasonable assumptions about the desired conditional plan. Indeed, in our definitions, we
allowed the unlimited number of sensing actions. This makes sense in many real life control
and planning situations where it is desirable to monitor the environment continuously, and
to make sensing actions all the time. This necessity is caused by the fact that in many real-
life situations, the consequences of each action are only known with a certain probability;
so, even if we know the exact initial state, and we know what exactly actions have been
performed, we are still not sure what the resulting state is, so we need to constantly monitor
the situation to find out the actual state. In this paper, we consider the situations in which the
result of each action is uniquely determined by this action and by the initial state. In such
idealized situations, there is no such need for a constant monitoring. It therefore makes
sense to allow only a limited repetition of sensing actions in an action plan. With such
a limitation, the complexity of planning drops back, and 0-approximation starts helping
again:
Definition 1. Let k be a positive integer.
• We say that a sensing action is k-limited if it reveals the values of no more than
k fluents.
• We say that an action plan is k-bounded if it has no more than k sensing actions.
Theorem 6. For any given k, for situations with incomplete information and with k-limited
sensing actions, the problem of checking the existence of a k-bounded action plan is 62P-
complete.
Theorem 7. For any given k, for situations with incomplete information and with k-limited
sensing actions, the problem of checking the existence of a k-bounded 0-approximation
action plan is NP-complete.
Comments.
• The same result holds if instead of assuming that k is a constant, we allow k to grow
as
√
log(|D|) (i.e., as a square root of the logarithm of the length of the input).
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• A difficulty with the general situation with incomplete information comes from the
fact that we do not know the exact states, i.e., we do not know the values of all
the fluents. It is therefore reasonable to analyze the situations with full sensing,
i.e., situations in which, for every fluent fi , we have a sensing action checki which
reveals the value of this fluent. Full sensing does make the planning problem simpler,
although not so simple that 0-approximation would help.
Theorem 8. For situations with incomplete information and with full sensing, the planning
problem is 52P-complete.
Theorem 9. For situations with incomplete information and with full sensing, the 0-
approximation to the planning problem is 52P-complete.






Partial information, 62P-complete NP-complete
no sensing (Theorem 2) (Theorem 3)
Limited number 62P-complete NP-complete
of sensing actions (Theorem 6) (Theorem 7)
Unlimited number PSPACE- PSPACE-
of sensing actions complete (Theorem 4) complete (Theorem 5)
Partial information, 52P-complete 52P-complete











2.6. Auxiliary result: 1-approximation is coNP-complete
In addition to 0-approximation, the authors of [2–4] considered other types of
approximations, including the so-called 1-approximation. In 1-approximation, partial
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states are defined in the same manner as for 0-approximation: i.e., as lists of fluents and
their negations. However, for an incomplete a-state s, the result of a (proper) action a on
the s is defined differently. Namely, incompleteness of an a-state means that there exists a
fluent fi whose value in s is unknown, i.e., for which neither this fluent fi nor its negation
¬fi belongs to s. If we add to s, for each such fluent fi , either fi or¬fi , we get a complete
state s′ ⊃ s which completes the original incomplete state s. Since the original a-state s was
incomplete, there exist several different complete states s′ which completes s in this sense.
To check whether a fluent literal f is true after applying the action a to the a-state s, we
do the following:
• we form all possible complete states s′ which complete s;
• we apply the action s to all these complete states s′; as a result, we get a collection of
resulting states ResD(a, s′);
• finally, we check whether f is true in all these resulting states ResD(a, s′).
If a fluent literal f is true in all these resulting states, then we say that f is true after
applying the action a to the a-state s.
Then, as a new a-state ResD(a, s), we take the set of all fluent literals which are true
after applying a.
In this section, we will show that the use of this new definition increases the computa-
tional complexity of an approximation. Namely, while for 0-approximation, computing the
next a-state ResD(a, s) was a polynomial-time procedure, for 1-approximation, computing
the next state is already a coNP-complete problem:
Theorem 10 (1-approximation). The problem of checking, for a given a-state s, for a given
action a, and for a given fluent f , whether f is true in ResD(a, s), is coNP-complete.
Comments.
• An ω-approximation is defined in a similar manner, except that in an ω-approxi-
mation, the result ResD(a, s) is defined not after a single action a, but after a sequence
of proper actions between two sensing actions. In the particular case when there is
exactly one proper action between the two sensing actions, ω-approximation reduces
to 1-approximation. Therefore, ω-approximation is also at least as complicated as
coNP-complete problems.
• These results show that if we want an approximation to decrease the computa-
tional complexity of the planning problem, then (at least from the viewpoint of
the worst-case complexity) 0-approximation is preferable to 1-approximation and
ω-approximation.
2.7. Conclusion and plans for future work: from complexity results to practical planning
This paper describes some computational complexity results on a propositional action
description language that allows for sensing and incomplete information about the initial
state.
In particular, this paper shows that adding sensing to the propositional planning problem
makes it PSPACE-complete even if there is a polynomial limit on the duration of the
action plan. One implication is that the conditional plan can be exponentially long. Various
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approximations and restrictions on sensing are considered. These typically put the problem
on the first or second level of the polynomial hierarchy (completeness for NP, coNP, 62P
or 52P).
These complexity results lead to a natural question: Is sensing simply a hard problem
we have to live with or are there some algorithms/heuristics/approximations that help us
solve at least some instances of the problem? The notion of 0-approximation somewhat
addresses this question.
We strongly believe that, although planning under 0-approximation is still NP-hard, the
ideas behind 0-approximation can lead to a solution of many practical instances of the
planning problem. This belief is prompted by the fact that many successful planners (see,
e.g., [10,11] and discussion above), in effect, assume or depend on 0-approximation in
some way or another.
To transform this belief into practically useful tools, we must further analyze the
relationship between 0-approximation and the extant planners. A first step in this analysis
has been taken in [4].
3. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. 1 Before we start the actual proof, let us comment on the relation
between the duration and the length of a plan. In general, these are two different notions,
and a polynomial restriction on a duration does not necessarily mean that the length of a
plan is also polynomially restricted (see the comment after the formulation of Theorem 4).
However, for situations without sensing, this difference, in effect, disappears. Indeed, since
we do not acquire any new information, at any given moment of time, for any conditional
plan, we can pre-determine which action we will be choosing. So, without sensing, for a
given initial state, we will be only using one branch of this conditional plan. Therefore,
it makes sense to only keep this branch, and thus, to consider only sequential plans. For
such plans u, the duration T (u) of the plan coincides with its length |u|, i.e., with the
total number of actions which constitute this plan. Thus, for situations with complete
information, the polynomial restriction on the plan’s duration T (u) 6 p(|w|) means that
we have a spolynomial restriction on the plan’s length |u|6 p(|w|). Now, we are ready for
the actual proof.
First, let us show that for situations with complete information, the planning problem
belongs to the class NP. Indeed, for a given situation w, checking whether a successful
plan exists or not means checking the validity of the formula ∃uP(u,w), where P(u,w)
stands for “the plan u succeeds for a situation w”. To prove that the planning problem
belongs to the class NP, it is therefore sufficient to prove the following two statements:
• the quantifier runs only over words u of tractable length, and
• the property P(u,w) can be checked in polynomial time.
The first statement immediately follows from the fact that in this paper, we are
considering only plans of polynomial (tractable) duration, i.e., in this case, sequential
1 Even though similar results already exist [5,6,14], we present this proof here as it will be used in our later
proofs.
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plans u whose length |u| is bounded by a polynomial of the length |w| of the input w:
|u| 6 p(|w|), where p(n) is a given polynomial. So, the quantifier runs over words of
tractable length.
Let us now prove the second statement. Once we have a plan u of tractable length, we
can check its successfulness in a situation w as follows:
• we know the initial state s0;
• take the first action from the action plan u and apply it to the state s0; as a result, we
get the state s1;
• take the second action from the action plan u and apply it to the state s1; as a result,
we get the state s2; etc.
At the end, we check whether in the final state, the desired fluent is indeed true. On each
step of this construction, the application of an action to a state requires linear time; in total,
there are polynomial number of steps in this construction. Therefore, this checking indeed
requires polynomial time.
So, the planning problem indeed belongs to the class NP. Let us show that it is
NP-complete. To show it, we will prove that the known NP-complete problem—the
propositional satisfiability problem–can be reduced to this problem. In the propositional
satisfiability problem, the input is a propositional formula F , i.e., any expression which
can be obtained from Boolean (“true”–“false”) variables x1, . . . , xn by using propositional
operations & (“and”), ∨ (“or”), and ¬ (“not”). The problem is to check whether the
given formula F is satisfiable, i.e., whether there exist values x1, . . . , xn which make the
formula F true. Let us show how, for each propositional formula F , we can design a
planning problem whose solvability is equivalent to satisfiability of the original formula F .
To simplify the desired reduction to a planning problem, let us first re-formulate the
propositional formula F in a more constructive (action-like) way. Namely, when the values
x1, . . . , xn are chosen, then for these values, checking the validity of the formula F is
straightforward: a computer can check this validity in polynomial (even linear) time. Let
us describe, step by step, how the computer will do this checking. In other words, let
us parse the formula F . Let us denote the intermediate results of this computation by
xn+1, xn+2, . . . . For example, if F is the formula (x1 ∨ x2)& (x1 ∨ ¬x2), then a possible
parsing of this formula is as follows:
• we start with the values x1 and x2;
• then, we compute the first disjunction x3 := x1 ∨ x2;
• then, we compute the negation x4 := ¬x2;
• after that, we are ready to compute the second disjunction x5 := x1 ∨ x4;
• finally, we compute the truth value of the resulting formula as the conjunction of the
two disjunctions: x6 := x3 &x5.
In general, we start with the variables x1, . . . , xn, and then, for k = n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , we
compute the value of xk in one of the three possible ways:
• either as xk := xf (k)&xs(k) for some values f (k) < k and s(k) < k;
• or as xk := xf (k) ∨ xs(k) for some values f (k) < k and s(k) < k;
• or as xk := ¬xf (k) for some value f (k) < k.
Based on this parsing representation of the original propositional formula, we can
construct the desired planning situation. Let xN denote the last value in the parsing
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construction. In our planning situation, we will have two actions: a and a−, and 2N + 1
fluents x1, . . . , xN, s0, s1, . . . , sN .
The intended meaning of these fluents and actions is as follows: In our designed plan,
in the first n actions, we select the values of the variables x1, . . . , xn, and then, in the
remaining N − n actions, we simulate the computation of the formula F . The meaning of
the fluent si is “we are at moment i”.
Initially, s0 is true and all other fluents are false. The goal of the plan is to make xN true.
Two groups of rules describe the effects of actions. Rules from the first group describe
the selection of the truth values; it also reflects the fact that each action increases time by
one:
a causes xi if si−1;
a causes si if si−1;
a causes ¬si−1 if si−1;
a− causes ¬xi if si−1;
a− causes si if si−1;
a− causes ¬si−1 if si−1.
Here, i takes values from 1 to n.
Rules from the second group describe the computation process. For every k from n+ 1
to N , depending on which operation computes xk in terms of xf (k) and xs(k), we get the
following set of rules:
• if xk := xf (k)&xs(k), then we add the following rules:
a causes xk if sk−1, xf (k), xs(k);
a causes ¬xk if sk−1,¬xf (k);
a causes ¬xk if sk−1,¬xs(k);
a causes sk if sk−1;
a causes ¬sk−1 if sk−1;
• if xk := xf (k) ∨ xs(k), then we add the following rules:
a causes xk if sk−1, xf (k);
a causes xk if sk−1, xs(k);
a causes ¬xk if sk−1,¬xf (k),¬xs(k);
a causes sk if sk−1;
a causes ¬sk−1 if sk−1;
• finally, if xk := ¬xf (k), then we add the following rules:
a causes xk if sk−1,¬xf (k);
a causes ¬xk if sk−1, xf (k);
a causes sk if sk−1;
a causes ¬sk−1 if sk−1.
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At the beginning, s0 is true, and all other “temporal” variables si are false. One can
easily check that if we apply any action (a or a−) to a state in which si is true and all other
“temporal” variables sj , j 6= i , are false, then in the resulting state, si+1 is true, and all
other temporal variables are false. So, by induction, we can prove that all accessible states
are like that. If we are in a state in which si is true and sj is false for every j 6= i , we will
say that we are at moment of time i . In these terms any action increases the time by one.
Thus, a possible plan can include no more thanN actions; hence, the length of any possible
plan does not exceed the length of the input data.
Actions performed at moments of time 1 through n select the truth values of the
propositional variables x1, . . . , xn. One can easily see that on each step k > n, the only
action we can apply is the action a, and, as a result of this action, we compute the truth
value of the auxiliary variable xk and increase the time by one.
The variable xN is originally false. The only rules which can make it true require than
we have sN−1 true; if we apply any action in a state in which sN−1 is true, we get a state
in which sN is true. So, the only way for xN to be true is for sN to be true as well.
Since each action increases time by one, no matter what sequence of actions we
choose, if we have reached sN this means that we have also computed the truth value
xN of the original formula F . Thus, the only way for xN to be true is for the original
formula F to be true under the chosen Boolean values x1, . . . , xn. So, if the above planning
problem is solvable, then the propositional formula F is satisfiable. Vice versa, if the
formula F is satisfiable, i.e., is true for some propositional values x1, . . . , xn, then we
can choose these values in our first n actions, and hence, get the solution to our planning
problem.
Thus, the solvability of our planning problem is indeed equivalent to the satisfiability
of the original formula F . The reduction is proven, and therefore, the planning problem is
NP-complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. First of all, let us show that for situations with incomplete
information and no sensing actions, the planning problem belongs to the class62P. Indeed,
incomplete information means that the initial values of some fluents are unknown. For
such problems, the existence of a successful action plan means the existence of an action
plan u1 for which, for every set of values u2 of the unknown fluents, the plan leads to a
success. In mathematical terms, the existence of a successful plan can be thus written as a
formula ∃u1∀u2P(u1, u2,w), where the predicate P(u1, u2,w) describes the fact that for
the planning problemw and for the values u2 of initially unknown fluents, the plan u1 leads
to a success. Now, to prove that this problem belongs to the class 62P, we must show that
the quantifiers run over variables of tractable length, and that the predicate P(u1, u2,w) is
tractable.
The quantifier u1 runs over plans and is, therefore, tractable; the quantifier u2 runs over
sets of values of fluents; each set of values is tractable (its length is equal to the number of
unknown fluents), so this quantifier is also tractable. Finally, if we know the values u2 of all
the initially unknown fluents, and if we know the sequence of actions u1, then we can easily
check, step-by-step, whether for these values of fluents, the given sequence of actions leads
to a success (this can be done exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1). Therefore, the predicate
P(u1, u2,w) is tractable. So, the planning problem indeed belongs to the class 62P.
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To prove that the planning problem is 62P-complete, we will show that we can reduce,
to the planning problem, a problem known to be 62P-complete: namely, the problem of
checking, for a given propositional formula F with the variables x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , xn,
whether
∃x1 . . .∃xm∀xm+1 . . .∀xnF.
The reduction will be similar to the one from Theorem 1, with two exceptions:
• In the planning problem constructed in the proof of Theorem 1, we assumed that
initially, all the variables xi were false. In the new reduction, we assume that only the
variables x1, . . . , xm are initially false, and that the values of the remaining variables
xm+1, . . . , xn are initially unknown.
• Correspondingly, rules from the first group (which generate the values xi ) are only
constructed for the values i 6m; for i from m+ 1 to n, we have, instead, “dummy”
rules which simply increase time by one:
a causes si if si−1;
a causes ¬si−1 if si−1.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the only way to make xN true is to go through a sequence
of N actions, in the first m of which we choose the truth values of the propositional
variables x1, . . . , xm, and in the last N − n of which we compute the truth value of the
original formula F using the selected values of x1, . . . , xm, and the original (unknown)
values of the propositional variables xm+1, . . . , xn. Therefore, the existence of a successful
action plan is equivalent to the possibility of choosing the values x1, . . . , xm for which, for
all possible values of xm+1, . . . , xn, the formula F is true. In other words, the existence of
an action plan is equivalent to the validity of the formula ∃x1 . . .∃xm∀xm+1 . . .∀xn F. The
reduction is proven, and so the planning problem in indeed 62P-complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. In 0-approximation, the existence of a successful action plan is
equivalent to ∃uP(u,w). In this approximation, at any given moment of time, the a-state
is described by a finite set of fluents and their negations, and, if we know the previous
a-state and the action, then we can find the next a-state in linear time. Therefore, in
0-approximation, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can check the successfulness of a given
action plan u for a given initial a-state w in polynomial time. Since the predicate P(u,w)
can be checked in polynomial time, and the quantifier ∃u runs over words of polynomial
length, the planning problem belongs to the class NP.
The fact that it is NP-complete follows from the fact that for the particular case of
complete information, 0-approximation coincides with the original planning problem, and
for complete information, as we have shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the planning
problem is indeed NP-complete. The theorem is proven. 2
Proof of Theorem 4. The proofs of this theorem and Theorem 5 are similar to [15].
First of all, let us show that if we allow sensing, then for situations with incomplete
information, the planning problem belongs to the class PSPACE. Indeed, the existence of
an action plan of a (tractable) length L can be reformulated as follows: there exists a first
action u1, such that for every possible sensing result u2 of this first action (if it is a sensing
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action), there exists a second action u3, such that for every possible result u4 of this second
action (if it is a sensing action), there exists a third action u5, etc., such that at the end, we
get the desired value of the goal fluent (for all possible values of still un-sensed fluents). In
mathematical terms, the existence of a plan can be thus re-written as
∃u1∀u2∃u3∀u4 . . .∀ukP (u1, . . . , uk,w),
where u1, . . . , uk−1 represent actions and results of sensing actions, and uk runs over all
possible values of un-sensed (unknown) fluents.
In this construction, we have two quantifiers per action in an action plan + one extra
quantifier at the end. Therefore, in total, we have k = 2L+1 quantifiers; sinceL is tractable
(i.e., bounded by a polynomial of the length of the input), the total number k = 2L+ 1 of
quantifiers is tractable too.
Therefore, to prove that this problem belongs to the class PSPACE, it is sufficient to
show that the predicate P(u1, . . . , uk,w) is tractable, i.e., that if we know u1, . . . , uk ,
and w, then we can check, in polynomial time, whether this predicate is true. Once we
know u1, . . . , uk,w, it means that we know the initial situation, and we know the values
of all the fluents, both sensed (from u2, u4, etc.), and un-sensed (from uk), and that we
know the actual sequence of actions (the first action is u1, the second is u3, etc.). Since we
know the values of all the fluents, and we know the action plan, we can check, in tractable
time, whether this particular action plan leads to success in this particular initial complete-
information state. Thus, the predicate P(u1, . . . , uk,w) is indeed polynomial-time, and the
planning problem indeed belongs to the class PSPACE.
To prove that the planning problem is PSPACE-complete, we will show that we can
reduce, to the planning problem, a problem known to be PSPACE-complete: namely,
the problem of checking, for a given propositional formula F with the variables
x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , xn, the validity of the formula
∃x1∀x2∃x3∀x4 . . .F.
This reduction will be a modification of the reduction which we used in our proof of
Theorem 1. As in that proof, we will start with parsing the formula F ; let xN denote the
last value in the parsing construction.
• In addition to two proper actions a and a−, i.e., actions which actually change
the state, we have a third action: a sensing action d which senses the value of the
fluent x1.
• In addition to 2N + 1 fluents x1, . . . , xN , s0, s1, . . . , sN , we have additional fluents
s1.5, s3.5, . . . , si.5, . . . for all odd integers i between 1 and n.
The new fluents represent “intermediate” moments of time:
• the moment 1.5 is intermediate between moments 1 and 2;
• the moment 3.5 is intermediate between moments 3 and 4; etc.
so that
1< 1.5< 2< 3< 3.5< 4< 5< · · ·< n.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the goal of the plan is to make xN true. Initially:
• s0 is true;
• all other fluents si are false;
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• all fluents x1, . . . , xn are unknown; and
• all fluents xn+1, . . . , xN are false.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, two groups of rules describe the effects of actions. Rules
from the first group describe the selection of the truth values x1, . . . , xn; they also reflect
the fact that each action moves us to the next moment of time. Rules corresponding to odd-
numbered variables x2i+1, i = 0,1, . . . (i.e., variables x1, x3, . . .) are similar to the ones
used in the proof of Theorem 1:
a causes x2i+1 if s2i;
a causes s2i+1 if s2i;
a causes ¬s2i if s2i;
a− causes ¬x2i+1 if s2i;
a− causes s2i+1 if s2i;
a− causes ¬s2i if s2i .
Here, i takes all integer values from 0 to bn/2c (i.e., all integer values i for which
16 2i + 16 n).
Rules corresponding to each even-numbered variable x2i , i = 1,2, . . . , include three
steps whose goal is to detect (“sense”) the value of this variable by using the sensing
action d :
• first, we swap the variable x2i with the variable x1, thus enabling d to measure the
value of what is now x1 (and what was originally x2i);
• then, we actually sense the value of x1 (which we will be able to later use in selecting
further action); and
• finally, we swap back the values x1 and x2i .
The rules corresponding to the first swap are as follows:
a causes x1 if x2i, s2i−1;
a causes ¬x1 if ¬x2i, s2i−1;
a causes x2i if x1, s2i−1;
a causes ¬x2i if ¬x1, s2i−1;
a causes s2i−1.5 if s2i−1;
a causes ¬s2i−1 if s2i−1.
The rule corresponding to sensing is simple:
d determines x1.
Finally, the rules corresponding to swap back are as follows:
a causes x1 if x2i, s2i−1.5;
a causes ¬x1 if ¬x2i, s2i−1.5;
a causes x2i if x1, s2i−1.5;
a causes ¬x2i if ¬x1, s2i−1.5;
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a causes s2i if s2i−1.5;
a causes ¬s2i−1.5 if s2i−1.5.
Rules from the second group describe the computation process; these rules are the same as
in the proof of Theorem 1.
Let us show that in this situation, the existence of a successful plan is equivalent to the
validity of the original propositional formula with quantifiers.
Indeed, if the original propositional formula with quantifiers is true, this means that there
exists x1 such that for every x2, there exists x3, etc., for which the formula F is true (i.e.,
for which xN is “true”). Here, x1 is a constant (“true” or “false”), x3 may depend on x2, x5
may depend on x2 and x4, etc. In other words, there exists:
• a value x1;
• a value x3(x2) which depends on the previous value x2;
• a value x5(x2, x4) which may depend on the previous values x2 and x4, etc.
for which, for all possible values of x2, x4, . . . , the formula F(x1, x2, . . .) is true (this
reformulation is called a skolemization of the original formula with quantifiers). Therefore,
we can use the following action plan to succeed:
• first, at moment 0, we select a or a− depending on whether the “existing” value of x1
is “true” or “false”;
• then, we use the swap sequence to exchange x2 and x1, measure the truth value of x1,
and swap back; as a result, we know the truth value of the variable x2;
• depending on the sensed value of x2, we select a or a− depending on whether x3(x2)
is true or false;
• then, we apply two swaps and sensing to sense the value of the variable x4, etc.
• after the moment sn, we apply the same action (action a) N − n times to compute the
truth value xN =“true” of the formula F .
Vice versa, let us assume that for our planning domain, there exists a successful action
plan, i.e., an action plan which makes the desired fluent xN always true. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, the only way to make xN true is to go through a sequence of all moments of
time, s0, s1, s1.5, s2, . . . , sn, sn+1, . . . , sN , and the only way to go through this sequence of
moments of time is to perform the corresponding actions. In particular, for x1, . . . , xn, we
must perform all the selecting actions and all the swaps. Of course, there is no necessity
to perform the sensing actions, but since performing a sensing action does not change the
actual state, we can always add these sensing actions to the action plan without changing
the successfulness of this plan. So, without losing generality, we can assume that in the
successful action plan, we are sensing the values of all the variables x2, x4, . . . . In short,
this action plan does the following:
• In the first action, we perform either the action a which leads to x1, or the action a−
which leads to ¬x1. In other words, in the first action, we select a truth value of the
variable x1.
• Then, we measure x2, and we select a truth value of the variable x3. In this selection,
we can use our knowledge about x2; so, the selected value is, in general, a function
of x2: x3(x2). (If we do not use x2, this simply means that we are using a constant
function which does not depend on x2 at all.)
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• After that, we measure x4 and select x5. In this selection, we can use our knowledge
about the values x2 and x4, so, in general, the selected value x5 is a function of x2 and
x4: x5 = x5(x2, x4).
• . . .
• After we have selected and sensed the values x1, . . . , xn, the resulting actions simply
simulate the process of computing the truth value (xN ) of the propositional formula
F(x1, . . . , xn).
The success of the action plan means that for all possible values x2, x4, . . . , the formula
F
(
x1, x2, x3(x2), x4, x5(x2, x4), x6, . . .
)
is true. This means exactly that there exists x1 such that for every x2, there exists an x3, for
which, for all x4, etc., the formula F(x1, x2, x3, . . .) is true. In other words, the existence
of a successful action plan means that the original propositional formula with quantifiers
is true.
Since we have already proven the implication in the other direction, we can thus
conclude that the existence of a successful action plan is equivalent to the truth of the
original propositional formula. The reduction is proven, and so the planning problem is
indeed PSPACE-complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 5. This result can be proven in a way which is similar to the proof of
Theorem 4:
• As in that proof, we can show that the 0-approximation to the planning problem
belongs to the class PSPACE.
• The fact that it is PSPACE-complete follows from the observation that in the planning
situation described (for reduction purposes) in the proof of Theorem 4, at any given
moment of time, our knowledge consists exactly in knowing the values of some flu-
ents, while other fluents can take arbitrary values. In other words, for this situation,
every action plan is also 0-approximate, so the existence of a successful action plan
for this problem is equivalent to the existence of a successful 0-approximate action
plan.
The theorem is proven. 2
Proof of Theorem 6. Let us first show that the planning problem belongs to the class62P.
Indeed, the existence of a successful plan can be written as ∃u1∀u2P(u1, u2,w), where u1
is an action plan, and u2 is the set of initial values of all initially unknown fluents. Here,
as in the proof of Theorem 4, u2 runs over words of tractable length and P(u1, u2,w) is a
tractable predicate. The only difference is with u1:
• previously (in the proof of Theorem 4), the action plan was simply a sequence of
actions, while
• now, an action plan can have some sensing actions inside, and the results of these
sensing actions determine the following action.
Each sensing action senses no more than k different fluents. Each fluent can have two
different values, so after sensing, we have 6 2k different sensing results. So:
• If we have a single sensing action in an action plan, the conditional action plan
branches itself into 6 2k possible branches (unconditional plans).
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• If we have two sensing actions, then each of 6 2k branches formed after the first
sensing action can, by itself, branch into 6 2k sub-branches, making it a total of
6 2k · 2k = 22k branches.
• We are allowing a total of 6 k sensing actions in each action plan, so we have
6 2k · . . . · 2k (k times)= 2k2 possible branches.
To describe a conditional action plan, we describe all action sequences which correspond
to different branches. The length of each branch is polynomial (i.e., it is bounded by a
polynomial of the length |w| of the input), and the number of branches is limited by a
constant (2k2 ) which does not depend on the length of the input at all. Therefore, the total
length |u1| of this description u1 is bounded by a polynomial of |w|. So, the first quantifier
also runs over words of tractable length. Therefore, the problem indeed belongs to the
class 62P.
We have already proven (in Theorem 4) that for the particular case of no sensing, the
planning problem is62P-complete. Therefore, this more general problem is62P-complete
as well. The theorem is proven. 2
Proof of Theorem 7. This proof is related to the proof of Theorem 5 in the same way
that the proof of Theorem 6 was related to the proof of Theorem 4: first, we prove that
the 0-approximate planning problem belongs to the class NP—by using the same coding
u1 of the conditional plans as in the proof of Theorem 6, and then we observe that since
a particular case (no-sensing) of this problem is NP-complete, this general problem is
NP-complete as well. 2
Proof of Theorem 8. First of all, let us show that for full sensing, the planning problem
belongs to the class 52P. Indeed, since sensing actions do not change the state of a
system, there is no harm in applying them first, and thus, determining the values of all
the fluents. For each revealed initial state, we have an unconditional action plan. Thus,
the existence of a successful conditional action plan for situations with full sensing means
that for every initial state u1, there is an (unconditional) action plan u2 which leads to a
success. In mathematical terms, the existence of a successful plan can be thus written as
a formula ∀u1∃u2P(u1, u2,w), where the predicate P(u1, u2,w) describes the fact that
for the planning problem w and for the values u1 of initially unknown fluents, the plan u2
leads to a success. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we can prove that the quantifiers run over
variables of tractable length, and that the predicate P(u1, u2,w) is tractable. Thus, for the
case of full sensing, the planning problem indeed belongs to the class 52P.
To prove that the planning problem is 52P-complete, we will show that we can reduce,
to the planning problem, a problem known to be 52P-complete: namely, the problem of
checking, for a given propositional formula F with the variables x1, . . . , xm, xm+1, . . . , xn,
whether
∀x1 . . .∀xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xnF.
The reduction will be similar to the one from Theorem 1, with three exceptions:
• In addition to two proper actions, we also have m sensing actions checki , 16 i 6m,
which sense the values of the variables x1, . . . , xm.
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• In the planning problem constructed in the proof of Theorem 1, we assumed that
initially, all the variables xi were initially false. In the new reduction, we assume that
only the variables xm+1, . . . , xn are initially false, and that the values of the remaining
variables x1, . . . , xm are initially unknown.
• Correspondingly, rules from the first group (which generate the values xi ) are only
constructed for the values i > m; for i from 1 to m, we have, instead, “dummy” rules
which simply increase time by one:
a causes si if si−1;
a causes ¬si−1 if si−1,
and the “sensing” rules
checki determines xi.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the only way to make xN true is to go through a sequence
of N actions:
• in the first m of these actions, we sense the truth values of the variables x1, . . . , xm;
• in the next n − m of these actions, we choose the truth values of the propositional
variables xm+1, . . . , xn; in this choice, we can use the “measured” values of
x1, . . . , xm;
• finally, in the last N − n actions, we compute the truth value of the original formula
F using the “sensed” truth values of the propositional variables x1, . . . , xm, and the
selected truth values of the propositional variables xm+1, . . . , xn.
Therefore, the existence of a successful action plan is equivalent to the possibility
that for every possible combination of the values x1, . . . , xm, we can choose the values
xm+1, . . . , xn for which the formula F is true. In other words, the existence of an action
plan is equivalent to the validity of the formula ∀x1 . . .∀xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xnF. The reduction
is proven, and so the planning problem is indeed 52P-complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 9. We already know, from Theorem 8, that for full sensing, the planning
problem is 52P-complete. To prove that the the existence of a 0-approximate plan is
52P-complete, it is therefore sufficient to show that for situations with full sensing, the
existence of a successful action plan is equivalent to the existence of a 0-approximate
action plan.
In one direction this implication is trivial: it is known [2–4] that a successful
0-approximate action plan is a particular case of a successful plan. Thus, if there exists
a successful 0-approximate plan, this means that there exists a successful plan.
Vice versa, let us assume that there exists a successful (conditional) action plan. Since
we have a situation with full sensing, we can, in principle, do the following:
• first, we sense all the fluents, thus determining completely the initial state;
• then, we follow the sequence of actions which is recommended by the original
conditional plan for this particular initial state.
For complete states, every plan is a 0-approximate plan. Therefore, what we described
is a successful 0-approximate plan.
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The equivalence between the existence of a successful plan and the existence of a
successful 0-approximate plan is thus proven, and therefore, the 0-approximation to the
planning problem is indeed52P-complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 10. First, let us show that this problem belongs to the class coNP.
Indeed, the fact that f is true is ResD(a, s) can be reformulated as ∀uP(u,w), where u
runs over all possible complete states completing the partial state s, and P(u,w) means
that the predicate f is true in the result of applying a to the complete state u. Here,
the quantifier runs over complete states—i.e., words of tractable length, and the predicate
P(u,w) can also be easily checked in polynomial time. Thus, this problem indeed belongs
to the class coNP.
To prove that this problem is coNP-complete, let us reduce, to this problem, a
problem known to be coNP-complete: namely, the problem of checking whether a given
propositional formula F with n propositional variables x1, . . . , xn is a tautology, i.e.,
whether it is true for all possible values of its variables x1, . . . , xn. It is known that this
problem is coNP-complete even if we restrict ourselves to propositional formulas of the
special type: namely, to 3-CNF formulas, i.e., formulas of the type C1 &C2 & · · · &Ck ,
where each “clause” Ci is of the type p ∨ q ∨ r , with p, q , and r being literals (i.e.,
propositional variables xi or their negations).
Let us now show how we can reduce an instance of a CNF-tautology problem to
checking whether f holds in ResD(a, s). Let C1 &C2 & · · · &Ck be a formula F with
propositional variables x1, . . . , xn. Then, we define a planning situation with n+ 1 fluents
f,x1, . . . , xn. In the initial state s, f is true, and fluents x1, . . . , xn are unknown. We have
k rules which describe the result of the action a—one rule for each clause Cj . Namely, for
each clause p ∨ q ∨ r , we have a rule
a causes ¬f if ¬p,¬q,¬r.
Let us show that f is true in ResD(a, s) if and only if the original formula F is a tautology.
Indeed, initially f was true; the only reason for it to stop being true is if for some complete
state u which completes s, we get ¬f , i.e., if for some values of the variables x1, . . . , xn,
for one of the clauses Cj ≡ p ∨ q ∨ r , we have ¬p&¬q&¬r . But this conjunction is
exactly the negation of the clause, so, in other words, f is not true in ResD(a, s) if and
only if for some values of the variables x1, . . . , xn, one of the clauses is false.
Therefore, f is true in ResD(a, s) if and only if for every choice of the variables
x1, . . . , xn, all clauses Cj are true—which is equivalent to saying that the original formula
C1 & · · · &Ck is true. So, f is true in ResD(a, s) if and only if the original formula is a
tautology. The reduction is proven, and so our problem is indeed coNP-complete. 2
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